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People v. Gaines250
(decided February 21, 1995)
The defendant asserted that he was denied a fair trial and that
his subsequent convictions for second degree burglary, criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, possession of
burglar's tools and resisting arrest violated his right to counsel
under the New York 25 1 and Federal252 Constitutions. 253 The
Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the judgment of
the trial court and held that an indigent's right to counsel "does
not encompass a right to the appointment of successive lawyers at
254
the defendant's option."
The defendant, Horace Gaines, an indigent, made a last minute
255 The
request at trial for a new court appointed attorney.
defendant claimed that his present court-appointed attorney "was
not representing [him] as far as the things that [needed] to be
said."' 25 6 Upon further inquiry by the court, requesting the
defendant to denote a specific complaint with his present counsel,
25 7
the defendant merely indicated that he requested new counsel.
The trial court denied his request claiming it was simply a delay
tactic made without cause and prior to the voir dire of the
jury. 258 The defendant claimed that such denial violated his
259
constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.
250. 212 A.D.2d 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d 970 (2d Dep't 1995).

251. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel.. .

."

Id.

252. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id.
253. Gaines, 212 A.D.2d at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
254. Id. at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71.
255. Id. at 728, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
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In analyzing the validity of the defendant's claim, the court
relied on People v. Koch2 60 and agreed that "an indigent

defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the right to
counsel." 261 However, this constitutionally based right to counsel
does not, according to the court, carry with it the right of the

defendant to arbitrarily seek to appoint successive attorneys. 262
In People v. Sawyer,2 63 the court of appeals addressed a similar

situation in which the indigent defendant acknowledged he was
not capable of defending himself but nevertheless continually
refused to be represented by the public defender's office. 2 64 In

affirming the appellate division's reversal of the defendant's
conviction, 265 the court asserted:
[W]hile it is true that an indigent defendant is guaranteed the
right to assistance of counsel by both our Federal and State
260. 299 N.Y. 378, 381, 87 N.E.2d 417, 418 (1949) (holding that "[t]he
State constitutional guarantee has been implemented by... legislative act
which makes it mandatory upon the court to inquire of the defendant... if 'he
desires the aid of counsel, and if he does the court must assign counsel.'"
(quoting CODE CRlM. PROC. § 308)); People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 187
N.E. 298 (1933). In Price, the court of appeals pointed out the pre-legislative
judicial authority to appoint counsel stating that "[e]ven prior to section 308 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, there was inherent power in the courts to
assign counsel to defend a prisoner who was without an attorney and unable to
employ one." Id. at 412, 187 N.E. at 299; see also Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942) (stating the right to counsel is one of the safeguards
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty and a
federal court cannot constitutionally deprive an accused whose life or liberty is
at stake of the assistance of counsel).
261. Gaines, 212 A.D.2d at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
262. Id. at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71 (citing People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d
822, 824, 551 N.E.2d 1233, 1234, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (1990)). In Sides,
the defendant, at trial, requested and was denied new court assigned counsel.
Sides, 75 N.Y.2d at 824, 551 N.E.2d at 1234, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The court
of appeals reversed the conviction and remitted for a new trial holding that
"the right to be represented by counsel of one's choosing is a valued one, and
a defendant may be entitled to new counsel upon showing 'good cause for
substitution.'" Id.
263. 57 N.Y.2d 12, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1982).
264. Id. at 15-17, 438 N.E.2d at 1135-36, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
265. See People v. Sawyer, 83 A.D.2d 205, 443 N.Y.S.2d 926 (2d Dep't
1981).
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Constitutions, this is not to be equated with the right to choice of
assigned counsel .... [T]rial judges have a duty to carefully
evaluate complaints concerning court appointed counsel and,
when appropriate, effect a change of counsel, "this is far from
suggesting that an indigent's request that a court assign new
266
counsel is to be granted casually."

The Gaines court asserted that there may exist circumstances in
which, following an inquiry by the court, a change of appointed
counsel is warranted. 2 6 7 In People v. Medina,2 6 8 the New York

Court of Appeals analyzed the court's responsibilities as to a
defendant's request for a change of court appointed counsel. The
Medina court held that the mere appointment of counsel is not

enough,

that

effective."

2 69

"[t]he

legal

assistance

provided

must

be

In addition, the trial judge has the duty to

"carefully evaluate serious complaints about counsel." 270
However, the Medina court emphasized that it is the court, not

the defendant, who dictates when there is to be a change of court

appointed counsel. The court explained that "as long as assigned
266. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 438 N.E.2d at 1136-37, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
421-22 (quoting People v. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 375 N.E.2d 768,
772, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 592 (1978)). In Sawyer, the court held that the duty
of the trial court went beyond repeatedly advising the defendant to accept the
public defender. Id. at 21, 438 N.E.2d at 1138, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 423. Rather
the trial court was obliged to make a "'searching inquiry' of a defendant to be
reasonably certain that the 'dangers and disadvantages' of giving up the
fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant." Id.
267. Gaines, 212 A.D.2d at 727, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 970 (citing to People v.
Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 375 N.E.2d 768, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1978)).
268. 44 N.Y.2d 199, 375 N.E.2d 768, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1978). In
Medina, the defendant claimed he was denied his constitutional right to counsel
by the trial court's refusal to replace his court appointed lawyer. Id. at 203,
375 N.E.2d at 769, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 590. The trial court judge stated that
Medina's request came just prior to the start of trial and there was never "the
slightest hint that the appellant was harboring any dissatisfaction with his
lawyer."" Id. at 205, 375 N.E.2d at 771, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 591. After repeated
failed efforts by the trial judge to ascertain the cause of Medina's
dissatisfaction with counsel, the request was denied as being no more than a
delay tactic. Id. at 206, 375 N.E.2d at 771, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92.
269. Id. at 207, 375 N.E.2d at 772, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
270. Id.
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counsel are men of ability and integrity, the discretion and
responsibility for their selection rests with the court." 27 1
However, where "good cause does exist a court is well advised
to effect a change of counsel." 272 The court in Medina supported
their position by citing section 5.3 of the American Bar
Association Standards which states:
Since a relationship of mutual confidence between a lawyer and
client is important to the lawyer's fulfillment of his professional
functions, where good cause is shown by the defendant why that
confidence does not exist the court should substitute counsel. Of
course, the defendant should not be permitted to use this
opportunity as a device to obstruct the orderly processes of the
courts ....273

As to "when" a court should initiate an inquiry into whether or
not there should be a change of counsel, the Gaines court stated
that "such an inquiry is only required for serious complaints
about counsel." 274
271. Id. at 207, 375 N.E.2d at 772, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93 (quoting
People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 181, 173 N.E.2d 227, 231, 212 N.Y.S.2d
401, 407 (1961)).
272. Id. at 208, 375 N.E.2d at 772, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The Medina
court held that in determining whether "good cause" exists "a court must take
into account such circumstances as whether the present counsel is reasonably
likely to afford a defendant effective assistance and whether the defendant has
unduly delayed in seeking new assignment." Id.; see, e.g., People v. Byrne,
17 N.Y.2d 209, 215-16, 217 N.E.2d 23, 25-26, 270 N.Y.S.2d 193, 196-97
(1966). In Byrne, the court held a trial judge had abused his discretion in
assigning one attorney to represent two defendants where there existed a
conflict of interest. Id.; see also People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 467, 280
N.E.2d 637, 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (1972). In Bennett, the court held
that the assigned counsel should have been replaced where he completely failed
to investigate or prepare an available insanity defense and as such his
representation of the defendant was deemed both inadequate and ineffective.
Id.
273. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d at 208, 375 N.E.2d at 772, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 593
(quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS § 5.3).
274. People v. Gaines, 212 A.D.2d 727, 728, 622 N.Y.S.2d 970, 971 (2d
Dep't 1995) (emphasis added). See also People v. Mason, 22 A.D.2d 957, 255
N.Y.S.2d 968 (1964). In Mason, the trial court gave an indigent defendant one
week to obtain new counsel following the defendant's motion to discharge his
present appointed counsel. Id. at 958, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 969. The Appellate
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Federal constitutional caselaw has been consistent with New
York holdings in the area of an indigent's right to counsel. In
Gideon v. Wainright,275 the United States Supreme Court held
that an indigent defendant in a felony case in a state court has a
constitutional right to have counsel appointed to him. 276 Under
the Federal Constitution, the indigent's right to counsel extends
to his first appeal as of right. 277 However, this right to counsel
recognized under the United States Constitution is not without its
limits. In Pennsylvaniav. Finley,2 7 8 the Court stated:
We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to
counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
conviction.... [O]ur cases establish that the right to appointed
counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Thus,

Division, Second Department held that the trial court was in error for failing to
inquire as to the grounds for such discharge of counsel, "which if true, would
have warranted his discharge." Id.
275. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
276. Id. at 343-44. The Court stated that:
The assistance of counsel is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of
life and liberty .... [I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any

person who is haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
Id. at 343-44. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding
that in federal courts "[i]f the accused ...

is not represented by counsel and

has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of life or his liberty").
277. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (stating that "[i]n
federal courts ...an indigent must be afforded counsel on appeal whenever he
challenges a certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith ...[and
that] [t]he federal courts must honor his request for counsel regardless of what
they think the merits of the case may be .

. . .").

But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417

U.S. 600, 610 (1974). In Ross, the Supreme Court refused to extend the right
to counsel on the first appeal as of right to discretionary appeals, holding that
"[t]he fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a
State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at
every stage of the way." Id.
278. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
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we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel
on discretionary appeals. 279
In conclusion, both New York and Federal Constitutional

principles demand that although an indigent defendant is entitled
to court appointed counsel in criminal cases, this right is not
unrestricted. Certainly, the right to services of a court appointed
attorney does not encompass the right to appointment of
successive lawyers at the defendant's option. Where the accused
can show a substantial need for new counsel, such as blatant
ineffective representation or a legitimate irreconcilable attorneyclient conflict, then the courts are obligated to provide the
indigent defendant with representation. However, where there are
de minimus or repetitive complaints by an indigent defendant, no
such constitutional obligation exists.

279. Id. at 555 (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1972) (Powell. J.,
dissenting)).
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